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1 INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium (henceforth NE) is the most widely used equilibrium concept in game
theory. Though a large and growing number of experimental studies indicate its weaknesses, it
has proved difficult to find systematic patterns in the deviations from NE. Given this, we believe
that it is worth considering alternative theories.
Goeree and Holt (2001) (henceforth GH) published an article with the provocative title “Ten
Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions” in which they claim that “for
each of these ten games there is an experimental treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to
predictions of NE” but where “a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency
between theoretical predictions and observed behavior”.1 In the present paper we restrict atten-
tion to the five one-shot games, which GH studied. We argue that many of the “inconsistencies”
in these games can be explained by ambiguity.
Ambiguity describes situations where individuals cannot or do not assign subjective proba-
bilities to uncertain events. This may be because the problem is complex or unfamiliar. There
is by now considerable experimental evidence which shows that individuals treat ambiguous
decisions differently from risks with known probabilities. The best known example is the Ells-
berg paradox, Ellsberg (1961).2 There is also experimental evidence that behavior in games
is affected by ambiguity see Colman and Pulford (2007) or Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper
(2007). We believe that ambiguity may be present in experimental games since the relevant
uncertainty is the strategy choice of one’s opponent. Human behavior is not intrinsically easy to
predict. We believe that it is plausible that there may be ambiguity in GH’s experiments since
each game was only played once. Hence subjects did not have time to become familiar with the
game or the behavior of their opponents.
We use a model of ambiguity axiomatized by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2008),
1 Goeree and Holt (2001) p. 1402.
2 This has been confirmed by the subsequent experimental literature, see for instance Camerer and Weber (1992)
and Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1985).
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(henceforth CEG), in which ambiguity is modelled by non-additive beliefs. Applying this the-
ory to games, implies that players will maximize a weighted average of the equilibrium pay-off,
the best pay-off and the worst pay-off of any given strategy. Subsection 2.1 will introduce these
preferences, provide some intuition for the parameters of this model and point to the experi-
mental literature, which tries to estimate them.
Tversky and Wakker (1995) study the relationship between decision weights and attitudes
towards risk and characterize the possibility and certainty effects. A majority of individuals ap-
pear to behave cautiously when there is ambiguity. Following Wakker (2001), who relates such
behavior to a generalized version of the Allais paradox, we shall refer to such cautious behavior
as pessimism. This article contains also a brief survey of the relevant experimental literature.
Experimental evidence also shows, that a minority of individuals respond to ambiguity in the
opposite way, which we shall refer to as optimism.
We model ambiguity in games by postulating that each player views the strategy choice
by his/her opponents as ambiguous. Players may react to this ambiguity either in an optimistic
way by over-weighting good outcomes or in a pessimistic way by over-weighting bad outcomes.
Subsection 2.3 defines an Equilibrium under Ambiguity (EUA), the equilibrium notion which
will be used in this paper.
Organization of the Paper The next section describes our basic model of ambiguity
in games. In section 3 we argue that GH’s results on one-shot games can be explained by
ambiguity. In Section 4 we discuss competing theories such as Quantal Response Equilibrium
and section 5 concludes. The appendix contains proofs of those results not proved in the text.
2 STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
This section introduces our model of ambiguity and uses it as the basis of a solution concept
for normal form games.
2.1 Non-additive beliefs
In the present paper we restrict attention to ambiguity in 2-player games, which requires the
2
following notation. A 2-player game Γ = h{1, 2} ;S1, S2, u1, u2i consists of players, i = 1, 2,
finite pure strategy sets Si and payoff functions ui (si, s−i) for each player. The space of all
strategy profiles is denoted by S. The notation, s−i, denotes the strategy chosen by i’s opponent.
The set of all strategies for i’s opponent is S−i. We shall adopt the convention that female
pronouns (she, her etc.) denote player 1 and male pronouns denote player 2.3
Beginning with Schmeidler (1989), ambiguous beliefs have been modelled as capacities,
which are similar to subjective probabilities except that they are not necessarily additive. We
shall use a model of ambiguity from CEG, which has the advantage that it is parsimonious in
the number of parameters. This theory represents beliefs by a neo-additive capacity ν defined
by:
ν (A|α, δ, π) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 for A = S−i,
αδ + (1− δ)π (A) for ∅ $ A $ S−i,
0 for A = ∅,
where α, δ ∈ [0, 1], π is an additive probability distribution π on S−i and π(A) :=
P
s−i∈S−i
πi(s−i).
They show that preferences may be represented in the form:
Vi (si;α, δ, π) = δ
∙
α max
s−i∈S−i
ui (si, s−i) + (1− α) min
s−i∈S−i
ui (si, s−i)
¸
+(1−δ) ·Eπui (si, s−i) ,
where Eπui (si, s−i) , denotes a conventional expectation taken with respect to the probability
distribution π.4
One can interpret π as the decision-maker’s belief. However (s)he may not be fully confident
in this belief. Thus it is an ambiguous belief. His/her confidence is modelled by the weight
(1 − δ) given to the expected payoff Eπui (si, s−i) . Or equivalently δ can be interpreted as a
measure of the ambiguity the decision-maker perceives. The highest (resp. lowest) possible
level of ambiguity corresponds to δ = 1, (resp. δ = 0). Ambiguity-attitude is measured by α,
which represents the optimism/pessimism of the decision maker. Purely optimistic preferences
are given by α = 1, while the highest level of pessimism occurs when α = 0. If 0 < α <
1, the individual is neither purely ambiguity-averse nor purely ambiguity-loving, since (s)he
responds to ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by overweighting good outcomes and partly
3 Of course this convention is for convenience only and bears no relation to the actual gender of subjects in
GH’s experiments.
4 For simplicity, we will write, in slight abuse of notation, Vi (si;α, δ, π) instead of Vi (si; ν (·|α, δ, π)) .
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in a pessimistic way by overweighting bad outcomes.
A possible interpretation is that the optimism parameter, α, is a personal characteristic of the
decision maker like his/her risk preferences. In contrast, the degree of ambiguity, δ,may depend
on the situation. In particular, one would expect there to be more ambiguity when players
interact for the first time. Growing familiarity with the game and the behavior of opponents is
likely to reduce ambiguity.
CEG also show that these preferences may also be represented in the multiple priors form:5
Vi (si;α, δ, π) = αmax
p∈P
Epui (si, s−i) + (1− α)min
p∈P
Epui (si, s−i) , (1)
where P := {p ∈ ∆ (S−i) : p > (1− δ)π} . For the case of one opponent with three pure
strategies, Figure 1 shows the set of probability distributions P(δ, π).
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r π2π3
p1 = (1− δ)π1
p2 = (1− δ)π2
p3 = (1− δ)π3
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P(δ, π)
p2 = 1 p3 = 1
p1 = 1
Figure 1. The set P(δ, π)
The multiple priors representation in equation (1) can be interpreted as follows. When an
individual perceives a situation as ambiguous (s)he considers more than one probability dis-
tribution to be possible. He/she reacts to ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by using the
most favorable possible probability and partly in a pessimistic way by using the least favorable
distribution.
5 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatized the multiple priors model, which represents ambiguous beliefs
by sets of probability distributions. Multiple priors and non additive beliefs produce related models of ambiguity.
However they are not, in general, identical
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2.2 Evidence on Individual Decisions
Experiments on decision-making with known probabilities have shown that individuals tend to
overweight both high and low probability events. As a result the decision weights assigned to
events are an inverse S-shaped function compared to the given probability distribution, (see for
instance, Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Abdellaoui (2000)). This can be explained by insensi-
tivity of perception in the middle of the range. For instance, the change from a probability of
0.55 to 0.60 is not perceived as great as the change from 0 to 0.05.
If probabilities are not known, a similar phenomena has been found (see, Kilka and Weber
(2001)). Individuals overweight both highly likely and highly unlikely events. (In this case
the likelihood of events is subjective.) This produces a pattern of decision weights like that
illustrated in Figure 2. The curved line represents the decision weights of a typical experimen-
tal subject and the 45o line represents SEU beliefs for comparison. This diagram is based on
observations that subjects are willing to take courses of action, which yield high outcomes in
unlikely events but refuse to accept even a small chance of bad outcomes. The more unfa-
miliar the source of uncertainty is the lower is the elevation of the curve, i.e. the curve shifts
downwards in less familiar situations. This can be interpreted as an effect of ambiguity.
.............................................
likelihood0
........................................
1
1
w(p)
decision
weight
Figure 2. Inverse-S decision weights
Kilka and Weber (2001) report an experimental study of choices in financial markets, which
was able to distinguish beliefs from decision weights. They found that decision weights deduced
from actual choices were markedly non-additive. Moreover the weighting scheme of a neo-
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Figure 3. Neo-additive capacity
additive capacity provides a simple version of an inverse-S shaped function relating beliefs, p,
to decision weights, w(p).
w(p) :=
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 for p = 1,
δα+ (1− δ) · p for 0 < p < 1,
0 for p = 0.
This weighting scheme is illustrated in Figure 3. It can be seen as a piecewise linear approxi-
mation to that in Figure 2.
Kilka and Weber (2001) used their data to estimate degrees of optimism and ambiguity sep-
arately. In terms of our notation, they report the following values:
α δ αδ
Average 0.5 0.52 0.26
Max. 0.62 0.61 0.34
Min. 0.4 0.41 0.18
The values of both optimism α and ambiguity δ vary around 0.5 with deviations of 0.1.
2.3 Equilibrium under Ambiguity
We shall use a solution concept based on Dow and Werlang (1994).6 Formally, we assume that
each player maximizes his/her expected payoff with respect to a non-additive belief. In equilib-
rium, beliefs have to be reasonable in the sense that each player “believes” that the opponents
play best responses. To model this we require that the support of any given player’s beliefs con-
tain only best responses of the other players. Denote by Ri(νi) = argmax{Vi (si, νi) | si ∈ Si}
6 Dow and Werlang (1994) assumed ambiguity-aversion. Their solution concept was later generalized to an arbi-
trary number of players in Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and extended to include optimistic behavior in Eich-
berger and Kelsey (2006).
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the best response correspondence of player i, given beliefs represented by the capacity νi.
Definition 2.1 A pair of capacities ν∗ = hν∗1, ν∗2i is anEquilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA)
if
∅ 6= supp ν∗1 ⊆ R1(ν∗2) and ∅ 6= supp ν∗2 ⊆ R1(ν∗1).7
If s∗i ∈ supp ν∗i for i = 1, 2, we say that s∗ = hs∗1, s∗2i is an equilibrium strategy profile.
If supp ν∗i contains a single strategy profile for 1 = 1, 2 we say that it is a pure equilibrium,
otherwise we say that it ismixed.8
A mixed equilibrium, where the support contains multiple strategy profiles, should be inter-
preted as an equilibrium in beliefs rather than randomizations.
2.4 Support of Ambiguous Beliefs
Most theories of ambiguity are formulated for single person decisions. To study ambiguity in
games it is necessary to extend them to allow for the interactions between different decision-
makers. In the absence of ambiguity, each player is assumed to choose a strategy which max-
imizes his/her expected payoff with respect to beliefs which are compatible with the mixed
strategies of their opponents. Most equilibrium notions rest on some degree of consistency be-
tween actual behavior and beliefs, since players are likely to adapt their beliefs if they observe
behavior which contradicts them. In the presence of ambiguity, perfect consistency is unlikely
since there do not exist non-additive randomizing devices, which prevents us from constructing
strategies, corresponding precisely to ambiguous beliefs. We consider games where each player
believes that the strategy choice of his/her opponents is possibly ambiguous.9 An equilibrium
is a situation where players behave optimally relative to their beliefs.
There is more than one way to extend the notion of a support from probability distributions
to capacities. This definition determines how tight the relationship between beliefs and actual
behavior is. Definition 2.1 requires the strategies in the support of a given player’s equilibrium
7 Existence of equilibrium can be proved in a standard way using fixed-point theorems, see Dow and Werlang
(1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2006).
8 Our aim is to modify Nash equilibrium by allowing for the possibility that players may view their opponents
behavior as ambiguous. If beliefs were additive, then in a 2-player game, Definition 2.1 would coincide with
Nash equilibrium. In this sense we have modified Nash equilibrium to allow for ambiguity.
9 There are other possible modelling choices, for instance, one could consider there is ambiguity about the
opponents’ type.
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belief, be best responses. It is ambiguous whether the opponents play best responses. As
result, in addition, the best and worst possible plays by one’s opponent are taken into account
when evaluating a strategy. Decision-relevant strategies outside the support can be interpreted
as events a player views as unlikely but which, due to ambiguity about the behavior of the
opponents, cannot be completely ruled out.
Several solution concepts for games with strategic ambiguity have been suggested, (see for
instance Marinacci (2000) and Lo (1996)). The main difference between the various solution
concepts is that they use different support notions. Thus the definition of support deserves
careful consideration.
Definition 2.2 We define the support of the neo-additive capacity ν(·|α, δ, π) by supp ν =
suppπ.
As explained above a neo-additive capacity is intended to represent a situation where the
decision-maker’s belief is represented by the additive probability distribution π but (s)he is not
fully confident in this belief. Given this it is plausible that the support of ν should coincide with
that of π. Eichberger and Kelsey (2006) show that, for a neo-additive capacity ν(·|α, δ, π),
supp ν =
\
p∈P
supp p, 10
where P is the set of probability distributions defined in equation (1).11
3 EXPERIMENTAL GAMES
Goeree and Holt (2001) present evidence that NE is a good predictor in some games but
not in others. In particular they consider five one-shot games, in which there is evidence in
favour of NE. However, in each case, a seemingly irrelevant parameter change produces the
opposite result. In this section we argue that this evidence can be explained by ambiguity. For
10 This definition of support essentially coincides with the inner support notion in Ryan (1997).
11 Much of the existing literature on ambiguity in games has explicitly or implicitly restricted attention to the case
of pessimistic players. In the present paper, an important part of our explanation of behavior in experimental games
relies to a large extent on optimistic responses to ambiguity. It is, therefore, necessary to reconsider the support
notions put forth in the previous literature. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of our proposal to
earlier support notions see Eichberger and Kelsey (2006).
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expository reasons we shall discuss the experiments in a different order to GH. To avoid undue
repetition, we shall discuss the first example in detail and present an outline of the argument for
the remaining games.
3.1 The Kreps Game
The impact of ambiguity is illustrated by the Kreps game, which is an asymmetric coordination
game with a safe strategy for Player 2, NN.12 The normal form of the game is described in the
following table:
GameA Player 2
Player 1
L (26%) M (8%) NN (68%) R (0%)
T (68%) 200, 50 0, 45 10, 30 20,−250
B (32%) 0, −250 10, −100 30, 30 50, 40
The numbers in brackets denote the number of subjects playing the respective strategies in GH’s
experiment. The only two Nash equilibria in pure strategies are hT,Li and hB,Ri. There is also
a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which Player 2 choosesM andL each with positive probability.
The only strategy which will not be played in any NE isNN. In stark contrast, almost two thirds
of subjects chose NN. Interestingly, this game shows another behavioral feature not mentioned
in GH. Given the strong incentive of Player 2 to choose NN, Player 1 could be expected to play
the best reply B. This is, however, not the case for subjects in GH’s experiment.
We claim that these results can be explained by ambiguity. For player 2, strategy NN gives
a certain pay-off of 30, even with ambiguity. All the other strategies can potentially give him
a negative pay-off. Thus pessimistic responses to ambiguity can motivate him to choose NN .
Suppose that he has an ambiguous belief that player 1 will play s1, where s1 can either take the
values T or B, then the Choquet expected utility of his other strategies is given by:13
V2 (L) 6 δ · [α · 50− (1− α) · 250] + (1− δ) ·max {u2(T, L), u2(B,L)}
= 50− δ · (1− α) · 300 6 30;
12 The name comes fromKreps (1995) who discusses the possibility that the level of payoffs, rather than their rela-
tive values, may affect players’ behavior. The payoffs have been modified to allow the game to be run ex-
perimentally. These modifications do not affect the set of equilibria.
13 For convenience we are suppressing the arguments α, δ and π.
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V2 (M) 6 δ [α.45− (1− α) · 100] + (1− δ) ·max {u2(T,M), u2(B,M)}
= 45− δ (1− α) · 145 6 30;
V2 (R) 6 δ · [α · 40− (1− α) · 250] + (1− δ) ·max {u2(T,R), u2(B,R)}
= δ · [α · 40− (1− α) · 250] + (1− δ) · 40 = 40− δ · (1− α) · 290 6 30;
provided δ(1− α) > max{50−30
300
, 45−30
145
, 40−30
290
} = 3
29
= 0.103. From which it follows that NN
is a best response. Most estimates for α and δ exceed this value by far. Hence in EUA, Player
2 will choose NN, for any beliefs compatible with the estimated values of α and δ.
The observed behavior of more than two thirds of Player 1’s choosing T , can be obtained
as an equilibrium under ambiguity, π∗1(T ) = π∗2(NN) = 1, but never as a NE. Assuming 2 is
believed to play NN, the CEU value of payoffs for Player 1 are:
V1(s1, NN) = δ ·
∙
α · max
s2∈S2
u1(s1, s2) + (1− α) · min
s2∈S2
u1(s1, s2)
¸
+ (1− δ) · p1(s1, NN)
=
½
δ · α · 200 + (1− δ) · 10) for s1 = T,
δ · α · 50 + (1− δ) · 30 for s1 = B.
Thus T, is preferred to B if and only if 150δα − (1 − δ)20 > 0, which would be positive for
δα ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5. Hence, with the experimentally observed parameter values for α and δ,
(T,NN) are equilibrium strategies.
3.2 The Traveller’s Dilemma
In the Traveller’s Dilemma, each player makes a claim ni for a payment between 180 and
300 cents, i.e., ni ∈ S := {180, 181, 182, ..., 298, 299, 300}.14 Given two claims (n1, n2), both
players obtain the minimum min{n1, n2}, but, if the claims are not equal, the player with the
higher claim pays R > 1 to the other, yielding the payoff function:
ui(n1, n2) = min{n1, n2}+R · sign(nj − ni),
with i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.
It is easy to see that for R > 1 each player has an incentive to undercut the opponent’s claim
by one unit. The following diagram shows the best-reply of Player 1. Hence, for any R > 1,
14 The story which motivates the game can be found in Basu (1994), where this game was introduced.
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claiming the minimum amount, (n∗1, n∗2) = (180, 180), is the unique NE. In fact, n∗i = 180 is
the only rationalizable strategy for each player, since it is the only strategy which cannot be
undercut by the opponent.
180 n1
n2
300
300
best reply
Figure 4. Best response of Player 1 without ambiguity
GH show, however, that the experimental results, depend on R. For large R, players claim
180, or close to this amount, as predicted by the NE. For R = 180, almost 80 percent of the
subjects chose ni 6 185. In contrast to the NE predictions, for small R, players make claims
close to 300, i.e., for R = 5, almost 80 percent of the players chose n > 295.
The evidence can be explained by ambiguity as follows. In the Traveller’s Dilemma, payoffs
are high if players coordinate on a high claim. As a result there are two possible best responses
to an action by one’s opponent. Either one can undercut by one unit or alternatively one can
choose 299, which yields the highest coordination gain and maintains at least the chance to
avoid the penalty. For R = 180 however, the penalty for being the highest bidder is extreme,
wiping out any possible gain from coordination. Hence, even a small amount of pessimism
in response to ambiguity will deter players from making a high claim and the only possible
equilibrium is where both claim 180.
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n¯(α, δ,R)
Figure 5. Best reply of Player 1 with ambiguity
In contrast, for R = 5, the penalty is so low that a little ambiguity and optimism, αδ
1−δ > 0.1,
suffices to make it worthwhile to claim 299. Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium best-reply
correspondence. There is a mixed equilibrium with two best responses 299 and n¯. For example,
if α = 0.4 and δ = 0.6, the ambiguous beliefs that one’s opponent would choose [n] = 285
would be 0.18 and the belief for 299 would equal 0.82. The observation, that 80 percent of
subjects chose a claim higher than 295, seems to be not obviously incompatible with EUA for
these values of α and δ. Further details are given in Proposition A.2 in the appendix. The table
below gives the values of n¯ for R = 5 and plausible parameter values.
α
δ
0.4 0, 5 0.62
0.41 268 274 280
0.52 279 283 286
0.61 285 288 291
3.3 Matching Pennies
In experiments on the Matching Pennies game, GH discover that subjects tend to conform
with NE predictions if the game is symmetric, but deviate systematically if the payoffs are
asymmetric. They study the following two versions of matching pennies.15 The ratios to the left
15 GH also consider a third version of matching pennies. This can be analyzed in a similar way.
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of the strategies indicate the unique NE mixed strategies and the bold numbers in brackets to
the right of the strategies show the percentage of players choosing the respective strategy in the
experiments.
Game B Player 2
Player 1
0.5 L (48%) 0.5 R (52%)
0.5 T (48%) 80, 40 40, 80
0.5 B (52%) 40, 80 80, 40
Game C Player 2
Player 1
0.12 L (16%) 0.88 R (84%)
0.5 T (96%) 320, 40 40, 80
0.5 B (4%) 40, 80 80, 40
The games differ only in the payoff of Player 1 for hT,Li , which is indicated by a bold-
face number. In mixed-strategy NE, the probabilities which a given player uses to randomize
are chosen to make his/her opponent indifferent between all of his/her equilibrium strategies.
Hence, a change in player 1’s payoff is predicted to leave her own behavior unchanged, while
causing a change in the behavior of player 2.
Actual play reveals, however, a quite different pattern. While the relative frequency of strat-
egy choices in Game B correspond to the NE prediction, they deviate dramatically from the
predictions in the asymmetric game. In Game C, Player 1’s choose almost exclusively strategy
T, the payoff which has been increased. As a result they make their behavior predictable, which
is exploited by the subjects in the role of Player 2. It is surprising that Player 1 does not appear
to foresee this shift in the behavior of her opponent. It appears as if Player 2 understands the
change in Player 1’s incentives better than she does herself. One interpretation of Player 1’s
behavior may be a shift in decision weights to extremely attractive low-probability events.
Ambiguity makes little difference to game B. Symmetry implies that the only equilibrium
is where each player believes that his/her opponent is equally likely to use either strategy. In
game C, optimistic responses to ambiguity cause player 1 to overweight unlikely events which
yield the high payoff 320. This causes her to choose strategy T almost exclusively. From Player
2’s point of view, the two strategies are symmetric. However 1 has a bias in favour of T. Hence
13
R is a best response for 2. Thus there is an equilibrium with ambiguity where the equilibrium
strategy combination is hT, Li . There is no NE which describes such behavior. There is a
unique NE, where Player 2 plays π(L) = 1
8
and Player 1 plays π(T ) = 1
2
. Such randomizations
are incompatible with the observed choices.
3.4 A Coordination Game with a Secure Option
GH study a coordination game, which is modified by giving Player 2 an extra secure option.
GameD Player 2
Player 1
L (?) H (84) S(?)
L (4) 90, 90 0, 0 0, 40
H (96) 0, 0 180, 180 0, 40
Game E Player 2
Player 1
L (?) H (76) S(?)
L (36) 90, 90 0, 0 400, 40
H (64) 0, 0 180, 180 0, 40
The two versions of the game are distinguished by the payoff of Player 1 when the secure
strategy, S, is played, (shown in bold). This strategy is strictly dominated by a mixture of L and
H, hence it will never be played in a NE.
The prediction of NE is the same for the two games. In each case there are three NEs, one
where both playH, one where both play L and a mixed strategy equilibrium where both players
randomize betweenH and L. GH note however, that 96 percent of subjects in the role of Player
1 and 84 percent of subjects in the role of Player 2 chose the strategy of the Pareto-dominant
equilibrium hH,Hi in Game D. Increasing the payoff of Player 1 for the strategy combination
hS, Li in Game E made it substantially more likely that Player 1 would choose L. This is even
more surprising since there was no corresponding change in the behavior of Player 2.
If players view their opponents behavior as ambiguous then Player 1’s perceives the worst
pay-off of both strategies to be the same. Thus pessimism will not influence her decision. In
game D, optimism increases the incentive for Player 1 to choose H and thus have some chance
of achieving the maximum pay-off, 180.
As discussed previously, experimental evidence suggests that δ ≈ 0.5 and αδ ≈ 0.25 are
plausible parameter values. For these values there remain multiple EUA leading either to coor-
14
dinated behavior on hH,Hi or hL,Li. However it is not implausible that there is more ambi-
guity in coordination games, since the multiplicity of equilibria makes prediction of opponents’
behavior harder. If ambiguity is sufficiently high, δ > 5
7
, even a low degree of optimism α = 0.4
will induce Player 1 to choose strategyH, no matter what belief π2 she holds regarding the op-
ponent. In this case, the only EUA would be π∗1(H) = π∗2(H) = 1, which corresponds fairly
closely to GH’s observations for Game D.
In Game E, optimistic responses to ambiguity may cause Player 1 to switch to strategy
L, even if she believes that Player 2 chooses H. Thus, there is a tendency to deviate from
coordinated behavior onH. In this case, any ambiguous beliefs compatible with the empirically
observed values of αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5 will induce Player 1 to choose L. For Player 2 the
CEU payoff difference remains unchanged. Hence, for ambiguity and optimism represented by
the parameter values αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5, there is a unique pure equilibrium in which both
players use strategy L.
The experimental results reported by GH (p.1408) show that coordination on the Pareto-
dominant NE, hH,Hi , is high (80 percent) in Game D, whereas coordination was low, 32
percent on hH,Hi and 16 percent on hL,Li , in Game E with the outside option yielding a
payoff of 400 for Player 1. This increase in “uncoordinated” behavior indicates that Player
2 found it more difficult to adjust to the incentive created by the potential payoff of 400 for
optimistic opponents.
3.5 A Minimum-Effort Coordination Game
In the minimum effort coordination game (also know as the weakest link model of public goods,
see Cornes and Sandler (1986)) two players have to choose effort levels from the set E =
{110, ..., 170} at a marginal cost of c < 1 yielding payoffs
ui(e1, e2) := min{e1, e2}− c · ei,
for i = 1, 2. GH played this experiment with the marginal cost parameters 0.1 and 0.9 and
observed the following distributions of play:16
16 Note that GH have grouped the data for five successive integers.
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Game F e = 115 e = 125 e = 135 e = 145 e = 155 e = 165
c = 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.6
c = 0.9 0.5 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15
The observations show a clear concentration of play on high effort levels in the case of low
costs, c = 0.1, and on the low ones for high costs, c = 0.9. Coordinating on any of the six
possible effort levels is a Nash equilibrium for either possible value of costs i.e., the set of NE’s
is {(e∗1, e∗2) ∈ E2| e∗1 = e∗2}. Thus Nash equilibrium is unable to explain why an increase in the
cost parameter changes behavior. Since the experiments were one-shot games and there were
many possible equilibria, coordination is not very likely.
We shall argue that such observations can be explained by ambiguity. In this game, the
best outcome is that your opponent plays the highest possible strategy. Suppose there is an
equilibrium with ambiguity in which both players coordinate on an effort level other than the
highest. If Player 1 increases her effort by one unit, the perceived marginal benefit is δα, which
is the weight on the highest outcome. The marginal cost of increasing effort is c. Thus if δα > c
it is in her interest to increase her contribution. Player 2 will think similarly. Hence under
the assumption δα > c the only possible equilibrium is where both players make the highest
contribution.
Suppose there is an equilibrium with ambiguity in which both players use an effort level
other than the lowest (i.e. 115). If Player 1 decreases her contribution by one unit the perceived
marginal reduction in benefit is δα + (1− δ) . The marginal cost saving is c. Thus if c >
δα + (1− δ) it is worth decreasing effort, which implies that the only possible equilibrium is
where both players coordinate on the lowest effort level.
With the average values of αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5 reported by Kilka and Weber (2001), one
has δ · α − c > 0 for c = 0.1 and c > [δ · α+ (1− δ)] for c = 0.9. For marginal costs of 0.1,
equilibrium with ambiguity predicts that players would try to coordinate on the highest effort
level, while for c = 0.9 they should coordinate on the lowest effort level. The observed behavior
seems to correspond well with this prediction. In particular, taking into consideration that
αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5 are average values of ambiguity and optimism and that the multiplicity
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of equilibria may create a high degree of ambiguity in a one-shot game, it is possible that
individual players have degrees of optimism and ambiguity satisfying
[δ · α+ (1− δ)] > c > δ · α. (2)
In this case, there would be multiple EUAwith equilibrium contributions between the extremes.
4 COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
The above discussion of the “Treasures” has shown the potential of EUA to explain obser-
vations in many experiments. GH survey evolutionary and learning models as descriptions of
behavior in games and suggest several alternatives, which appear to provide good explanations
of experimental data. In particular, they find that evolutionary models with random shocks may
describe observed behavior better than NE. The logistic quantal response function of McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1995) also offers better predictions of behavior in experiments on one-shot
games. This may be interpreted either as dynamic noisy learning rule or as an iterated noisy
introspection process. They used this as the basis of an alternative equilibrium concept, Quan-
tal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which proved to be a successful alternative in explaining the
results of experimental games. For example, Boylan and Grant (2006) show that behavior in
the asymmetric Matching-Pennies game can be explained by QRE, a fact also noted by Goeree,
Holt, and Palfrey (2004).
For two players17 with finite strategy sets S1 and S2 and payoff functions u1(s1, s2) and
u2(s1, s2), a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is a mixed strategy combination (π1, π2)
such that
πi(si) = fi(si, π−i) :=
exp
¡
λi · Eπ−iui(si, ·
¢P
si∈Si
exp
¡
λi · Eπ−iui(s, ·
¢
for all si ∈ Si. The parameter λi measures the responsiveness of a player. For λi = 0 one has
a uniform distribution over one’s strategies, independent of the expected payoff. For λi → ∞
all the weight is shifted to the strategy with the highest expected payoff. The parameter λi can
be adjusted such that the best-possible fit of the equilibrium probabilities πi with the relative
17 A generalisation to games with many players is straightforward.
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Figure 6.
frequencies of actual behavior is achieved.
In the matching-pennies games of Section 3.3 we have only two pure strategies. Thus, we
can identify the mixed strategy of each player with the probability qi of playing the strategies T
or L, respectively.
q1 = f1(T, q2) :=
exp(λ1·[80q2+40(1−q2)])
exp(λ1·[80q2+40(1−q2)])+exp(λ1·[40q2+80(1−q2)]) ,
q2 = f2(L, q1) :=
exp(λ2·[40q1+80(1−q1)])
exp(λ2·[80q1+40(1−q1)])+exp(λ2·[40q1+80(1−q1)]) .
For λ = 10, the quantal response function f1(T, q2) looks almost like the best-reply correspon-
dence of the symmetric matching-pennies Game A.
On the other hand, if the payoff of Player 1 from (T,L) is increased to 320 as in Game B,
the following equilibrium conditions obtain:
q1 = f1(T, q2) :=
exp(λ1·[320q2+40(1−q2)])
exp(λ1·[320q2+40(1−q2)])+exp(λ1·[40q2+80(1−q2)]) ,
q2 = f2(L, q1) :=
exp(λ2·[40q1+80(1−q1)])
exp(λ2·[80q1+40(1−q1)])+exp(λ2·[40q1+80(1−q1)]) .
The figure below shows the quantal response function f1(T, q2), again for the parameter values
λ = 1 and λ = 10. The quantal response function becomes now almost vertical at q2 = 0.125.
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The equilibrium value of q1 must be close to this value and therefore, QRE describes actual
behavior better than NE.
There is a deeper reason why EUA, like QRE allows a better description of behavior. In
both cases, players consider absolute as well as relative payoffs. In the QRE this is achieved by
the assumption that the probability that a pure strategy will be played depends on its expected
payoff. In an EUA, we consider still best replies, but due to optimism and ambiguity the best
and worst outcomes are over-weighted. Depending on the degree of ambiguity these effects may
be stronger or weaker, just as the parameter λ increases or reduces the impact of the expected
payoffs.
Both approaches are more flexible in describing actual behavior than NE, however we believe
that EUA may be given a more attractive interpretation. Optimism can be viewed as a personal
characteristic, which we may take as given, like a player’s preferences. Ambiguity, on the other
hand, is more situation-dependent. In particular, one would predict that a one-shot game is by
nature more ambiguous than a repeated game. Hence, there are testable hypotheses regarding
EUA which have no counter-part in QRE. Moreover, there is substantial evidence on individual
behavior, which allows one to predict the attitude of a decision-maker towards ambiguity. Such
evidence can help to restrict behavior in EUA, which makes the theory more powerful. It is a
particular strength of EUA that it can explain the diverging behavior in many games with the
same set of ambiguity and optimism parameters.
Indeed, a recent paper by Haile, Hortascu, and Kosenok (2003) shows that "without a priori
distributional assumptions, a QRE can match any distribution of behavior by each player in any
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normal form game".
Boylan and Grant (2006) also find that the Quantal Response Equilibrium of McKelvey and
Palfrey (1995) explains behavior in the asymmetric matching pennies experiments of GH better
than NE. Moreover, they show that fairness-based payoff transformations as suggested in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Rabin (1993) do not predict the observed behavior.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown that many of the treasures of game theory from GH can be
explained as responses to ambiguity. We have only analyzed those treasures based on normal
form games. The other experiments concern dynamic games some of which also have incom-
plete information. To study the impact of ambiguity in these cases it would be necessary to
develop new solution concepts for such games. This is beyond the scope of a short article.
Nevertheless we believe that explanations based on ambiguity could be found for many of these
games as well. For instance, the treasure from GH entitled ‘Should you believe a threat that is
not credible’ is very similar to the model of frivolous lawsuits in Eichberger and Kelsey (2004).
The preferences we use have the effect of over weighting the best and worst outcomes. The
worst outcome may often be death. However it is likely that ambiguity-aversion would cause
other bad outcomes to be over weighted such as losing large sums of money. Similarly optimism
might have the effect that a number of good outcomes are overweighted rather than just the best
outcome. While this objection may have some merits in general, the games studied in this paper
typically have salient best and worst outcomes. It does not seem implausible that these should
be subjectively overweighted. In Eichberger and Kelsey (2006) we show that much of our
analysis can be extended to the more general case where a number of good and bad outcomes
are over weighted.
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Appendix A. TECHNICAL APPENDIX
This appendix is not intended for publication. It is included to enable the referee and editor to
check the proofs. Each section gives details of the model and proves the claims made in the
corresponding section of the text.
A.1 The Traveller’s Dilemma
Consider Player 1. Suppose she holds beliefs which are represented by a neo-additive capacity:
ν(A|α, δ, π) = αδ+(1− δ) π(A).Given these beliefs, Player 1’s Choquet expected utility from
the choice of n1 is
V (n1;α, δ, π) = δ
∙
αmax
n2∈S
u1 (n1, n2) + (1− α) min
n2∈S
u1 (n1, n2)
¸
+(1− δ) ·
X
n2∈S
u1 (n1, n2) · π(n2).
Lemma A.1 Suppose Player 1’s beliefs are given by a neo-additive capacity ν(·|α, δ, n2) de-
fined by ν(∅|α, δ, n2) = 0, ν(S2|α, δ, n2) = 1, ν(A|α, δ, n2) = δα if n2 /∈ A, ν(A|α, δ, n2) =
δα+(1− δ) , if n2 ∈ A. Note that ν(·|α, δ, n2) has degree of pessimism α, degree of ambiguity
δ. If α and δ satisfy α < 0.5, δ < 0.5 and 0.1 6 αδ
1−δ 6 0.9, then the best-reply correspondence
is
R1(ν(·|α, δ, n2)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
299 for n2 < n(α, δ,R)
n2 − 1 otherwise
with
n(α, δ,R) := 300− 1− δ
αδ
[2R− 1] .
Proof. First note that R > 1, n1 = 299 weakly dominates n1 = 300, moreover, for α, δ > 0,
n1 = 300 is strictly dominated. Since the highest pay-off for n1 = 299 is greater than that for
n1 = 300, and under our assumptions on α and δ, the highest payoff gets positive weight in the
Choquet integral. Thus we may eliminate the possibility that either player plays strategy 300.
Consider n2 = 180. The CEU of a pure strategy n1 is easily computed as18
V (n1;α, δ, π180) :=
Z
u1 (n1, ·) dν1(·|α, δ, π180)
= δ
∙
αmax
n2∈S
u1 (n1, n2) + (1− α) min
n2∈S
u1 (n1, n2)
¸
+ (1− δ) · u1 (n1, 180)
18 Here πn2 denotes the Dirac measure with support n2.
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=⎧
⎨
⎩
δ [α (180 +R) + (1− α)180] + (1− δ) · 180 for n1 = 180,
δ [α (n1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · [180−R] for 180 < n1 < 300,
Consider next n2 ∈ (180, 300). The CEU of a pure strategy combination (n1, n2) is,
V (n1;α, δ, πn2) :=
Z
u1 (n1, ·) dν1(·|α, δ, πn2)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
δ [α (180 +R) + (1− α)180] + (1− δ) · [180 +R] for n1 = 180;
δ [α (n1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · [n1 +R] for 180 < n1 < n2;
δ [α (n1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · n1 for n1 = n2;
δ [α (n1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · [n2 −R] for n2 < n1 < 300.
(ii) For n2 = 180, V (n1;α, δ, π180) is strictly increasing in n1 for n1 > 180. Hence,
V (299;α, δ, π180)− V (180;α, δ, π180) = αδ (299− 180)− (1− αδ)R
= 119αδ − (1− αδ)R.
Thus
R1(ν(·|α, δ, 180)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
299 for αδ > R
119+R ,
180 otherwise.
Notice, for R = 5, R
119+R =
5
124
≈ 0.041 6 0.1. Hence, R1(ν(·|α, δ, 180)) = 299. For
R = 180, we have R
119+R =
180
299
≈ 0.6 and depending on the values of α and δ the best reply
may be R1(ν(·|α, δ, 180)) = 180.
(iii) Consider now n2 ∈ (180, 300).
For n1 ∈ (180, n2) ∪ (n2, 300) the CEU value is strictly increasing in n1. Hence, only
n1 = 180, n1 = n2 − 1, n1 = n2, or n1 = 299 can be best responses.
(a) Comparing n1 = n2 − 1 and n1 = n2, we observe that
V (n2;α, δ, πn2)− V (n2 − 1;α, δ, πn2)
= {δ [α (n2 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · n2}
− {δ [α (n2 − 1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · [n2 − 1 +R]}
= δα+ (1− δ) · [1−R] = [δα+ δ(R− 1)]− (R− 1) < 0
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holds, for R > 1 + α. For R = 5 and R = 180, this condition is satisfied. Hence, n1 = n2
cannot be a best reply.
(b) Comparing n1 = 180 and n1 = 299.
(b1) Suppose 181 6 n2 6 298, then we observe that
V (299;α, δ, πn2)− V (180;α, δ, πn2) = [δ [α (299 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · [n2 −R]]
− [δ [α (180 +R) + (1− α)180] + (1− δ) · [180 +R]]
= 119δα+ (1− δ) · [n2 − 180− 2R] T 0⇔ n2 T 180 + 2R− δα
1− δ119.
By the assumption 0.1 6 αδ
1−δ 6 0.9, we obtain for R = 5, 180 > 180 + 2R − 0.1 · 119 >
180 + 2R− δα
1−δ119. Hence, for R = 5, V (299;α, δ, π
n2) > V (180;α, δ, πn2) for all n2 > 180.
Moreover, for R = 180, we find that 180+ 2R− δα
1−δ119 > 180 + 2R− 0.9 · 119 > 300. Thus,
V (180;α, δ, πn2) > V (299;α, δ, πn2) in this case.
(b2) For n2 = 299
V (299;α, δ, π299)− V (180;α, δ, π299)
= {δ [α (299 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · 299}
− {δ [α (180 +R) + (1− α)180] + (1− δ) · [180 +R]}
= 119δα+ (1− δ) · [119−R] T 0 ⇐⇒ 119
µ
1 +
αδ
1− δ
¶
T R.
For R = 5, this condition is satisfied, hence, n1 = 299 is the best reply to a belief concentrated
on n2 = 299. For R = 180, however, n1 = 180 may be the best reply.
(c) Comparing n1 = n2 − 1 with n1 = 299.
(c1) For n2 = 299, we obtain
V (298;α, δ, π299)− V (299;α, δ, π299)
= {δ [α (298 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · (298 +R)}
− {δ [α (299 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · 299}
= δα (−1) + (1− δ) · (R− 1) R 0
for R R 1 + αδ
1−δ . From δ < 0.5 we have R > 1 +
αδ
1−δ for R > 2. Thus, n1 = 298 is the best
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reply to 299.
(c2) For n2 < 299, we obtain
V (n2 − 1;α, δ, πn2)− V (299;α, δ, πn2)
= {δ [α (n2 − 1 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · (n2 − 1 +R)}
− {δ [α (299 +R) + (1− α) (180−R)] + (1− δ) · (n2 −R)}
= δα (n2 − 300) + (1− δ) · (2R− 1) ,
thus
n2 R 300−
1− δ
αδ
[2R− 1] =: n(α, δ,R).
Hence,
R1(ν(·|α, δ, n2)) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
299 for n2 < n(α, δ,R),
n2 − 1 otherwise.
Notice, for R = 5, n(α, δ, R) can range between 210 and 290. For R = 180, we have
180 > n(α, δ, R). Thus, n1 = n2 − 1 is the best response for all n2 > 180.
The following proposition yields the symmetric equilibrium under ambiguity of this game.
The notation [x] refers to the smallest integer larger or equal to x. For ease of notation, we will
suppress the arguments of the function n(α, δ,R) and will write n for its value.
Proposition A.2 (EUA of the traveller’s dilemma) Suppose the conditions of Lemma A.1 are
satisfied.
1. For R = 180, in the unique symmetric EUA both players have beliefs:
π∗(180) = 1.
In response, both players choose n∗1 = n∗2 = 180.
2. For R = 5, in the unique symmetric EUA both players have beliefs:
π∗([n]) =
∙
1 +
αδ
1− δ
¸
· 299− [n]
299− [n] +R,
π∗(299) =
R
(299− [n] +R) −
αδ
1− δ ·
(299− [n])
(299− [n] +R) ,
where
n(α, δ,R) := 300− 1− δ
αδ
[2R− 1] .
In response, both players choose n∗1, n∗2 ∈ {[n] , 299}.
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Proof. The equilibrium beliefs π∗ of an EUA must make players indifferent between the claims
of [n] and 299.Clearly, all strategies which are not best responses will be played with probability
zero. Hence, we can set π∗(n) = 0 for all n /∈ {[n] , 299}. For notational convenience, let
π∗([n]) = β and π∗(299) = 1− β. An EUA is defined by the equation,
V ([n] ;α, δ, π∗)− V (299;α, δ, π∗) = 0.
Equivalently, one has
δ [α ([n] +R) + (1− α) [180−R]] + (1− δ) · {[n] · π∗([n]) + ([n] +R) · π∗(299)}
−δ [α (299 +R) + (1− α) [180−R]] + (1− δ) · {([n]−R) · π([n]) + (299) · π(299)}
= δα ([n]− 299) + (1− δ) · {R · β + ([n]− 299 +R) · (1− β)} = 0.
Solving for β, we obtain
β =
∙
1 +
αδ
1− δ
¸
· 299− [n]
299− [n] +R.
Hence,
π∗([n]) =
∙
1 +
αδ
1− δ
¸
· 299− [n]
299− [n] +R
π∗(299) =
R
(299− [n] +R) −
αδ
1− δ ·
(299− [n])
(299− [n] +R) .
A.2 Matching Pennies
Let x be the payoff of Player 1 at the strategy combination (T, L). Consider first Player 1’s
payoffs:19
V1(T )− V1(B) = δ [αx+ (1− α) 40] + (1− δ) [x · π(L) + 40 · π(R)]
−δ [α80 + (1− α) 40]− (1− δ) [40 · π(L) + 80 · π(R)]
= δα (x− 80) + (1− δ) [x·π(L)− 40] .
19 For convenience we suppress α, δ and π.
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Similarly, for Player 2 we obtain
V2(L)− V2(R) = δ [α80 + (1− α) 40] + (1− δ) [40 · π(T ) + 80 · π(B)]
−δ [α80 + (1− α) 40]− (1− δ) [80 · π(T ) + 40 · π(B)]
= (1− δ)40 · [π(B)− π(T )] = (1− δ)80
∙
1
2
− π(T )
¸
.
In game B, where x = 80,
π∗(L) = π∗(R) =
1
2
,
π∗(T ) = π∗(B) =
1
2
,
is the only EUA for any degree of optimism α and any degree of ambiguity δ.
Straightforward computations show that when x = 320,
V1 (T )− V1 (B) = 240δa+ (1− δ)320
∙
π(L)− 1
8
¸
> 240δa− (1− δ)40.
For values of αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5, which are approximately the average values found in
Kilka and Weber (2001), T will be preferred to B for any beliefs about player 2’s behavior.
Consistent beliefs of Player 2 are π(T ) = 1 for which value
V2(L;α, δ, π)− V2(R;α, δ, π) = (1− δ)80
∙
1
2
− π(T )
¸
< 0
follows. Hence,
π∗(L) = 0, π∗(R) = 1,
π∗(T ) = 1, π∗(B) = 0,
will be equilibrium beliefs in the unique EUA for optimism and ambiguity parameters close to
αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5.
A.3 A Coordination Game with a Secure Option
Consider players who view their opponents behavior as ambiguous, one obtains the following
evaluations of their actions. For GameD, one obtains the CEU-payoff differences:
V1(H;α, δ, π2)− V1(L;α, δ, π2) = 90δα+ 180(1− δ)
∙
π2(H)−
1
2
π2(L)
¸
and V2(H;α, δ, π1)− V2(L;α, δ, π1) = 90δα+ 180(1− δ)
£
π1(H)− 12π1(L)
¤
.
With the level of ambiguity, δ ≈ 0.5, and ambiguity-attitudes, αδ ≈ 0.25, there remain
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multiple EUA leading either to coordinated behavior on hH,Hi or hL,Li. If ambiguity is
sufficiently high, δ > 5
7
, even a low degree of optimism α = 0.4 will induce Player 1 to choose
the strategyH, no matter what belief π2 she holds regarding the opponent. In this case, the only
EUA would be π∗1(H) = π∗2(H) = 1.
In Game E, we obtain the following CEU payoff:
V1(H;α, δ, π2)− V1(L;α, δ, π2) = −220δα+ (1− δ) · [580 · π2(H) + 310 · π2(L)− 400]
6 −220δα+ 180(1− δ).
In this case, the empirically observed values of αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5 are high enough to
induce Player 1 to choose strategy L, no matter what beliefs π∗2 she holds over her opponent’s
behavior. For Player 2 the CEU payoff difference remains unchanged. Hence, for ambiguity and
optimism represented by the parameter values αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5, the unique equilibrium
under ambiguity has beliefs π∗1(L) = π∗2(L) = 1.
A.4 A Minimum-Effort Coordination Game
Consider player 1. Her (Choquet) expected pay-off is given by:
V1(e1;α, δ, πe2) = δ ·
∙
α · max
e2∈E2
u1(e1, e2) + (1− α) · min
e2∈E2
u1(e1, e2)
¸
+ (1− δ) · u1(e1, e2)
= δ · [α · (e1 − c · e1) + (1− α) · (110− c · e1)] + (1− δ) · (min{e1, e2}− c · e1)
= δ · (1− α) · 110 + [δ · α · e1 + (1− δ) ·min{e1, e2}]− c · e1.
For any level of effort e2, which the opponent may choose the payoff from increasing effort by
one unit is: ⎧
⎨
⎩
[δ · α+ (1− δ)]− c if e1 < e2,
δ · α− c if e1 > e2.
Hence, choosing the highest effort level is always optimal if δ·α−c > 0. The unique equilibrium
beliefs of EUA are in this case π∗1(170) = π∗2(170) = 1. Conversely, for c > [δ · α+ (1− δ)]
the lowest level of effort is optimal, yielding an EUA with beliefs π∗1(110) = π∗2(110) = 1.
With the average values of αδ ≈ 0.25 and δ ≈ 0.5, one has δ · α − c > 0 for c = 0.1 and
c > [δ · α+ (1− δ)] for c = 0.9. For marginal costs of 0.1 one would expect players to try to
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coordinate on the highest effort level, while for c = 0.9 they should coordinate on the lowest
effort level.
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